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Introduction
By March 2013 a joint French and Malian 
military operation, backed by a growing 
deployment of troops from the African-
led International Support Mission to Mali 
(AFISMA), had pushed back a militant offen-
sive against strategic towns in central Mali. 
At the time of writing, AFISMA is set to be 
absorbed into a newly mandated UN peace-
keeping mission in Mali on 1 July 2013, 
although the exact time-frame for such a 
“re-hatting” may alter, as the UN mission will 
only be deployed if the security situation has 
been sufficiently stabilized by then (Boutellis 
and Williams 2013b). Whatever happens in 
the longer term it is clear that in the coming 
few months, as the French forces scale-down 
and largely withdraw, the international com-
munity will still rely on AFISMA as a central 
part of the security pillar of its immediate 
stabilization strategy for Mali, and AFISMA 
personnel seem likely to form the vanguard 
element of the new UN mission, when they 
are “re-hatted” as UN peacekeepers. 
In Somalia, the African Union Mission for 
Somalia (AMISOM) and Somalia government 
forces have made considerable gains against 
Al-Shabaab, the militant group, particularly 
over the last 18 months. A military campaign 
that bought sudden and unexpected pro-
gress in August 2011 has provided space for 
the conclusion of the political transition and 
the establishment of the new Federal Gov-
ernment. However, these security gains will 
only be sustained if effective and acceptable 
governance for those areas recovered from 
Al-Shabaab can be arranged (Williams 2012). 
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In this new phase, AMISOM and the UN are 
reconfiguring in light of the most recent UN 
Security Council resolutions 2093 adopted 
on 6 March 2013 and 2102 adopted on 2 
May 2013.2
As with AFISMA, AMISOM was initially 
deployed with the expectation that when 
conditions permitted, the UN Security Coun-
cil would deploy a UN peacekeeping opera-
tion that would subsume or replace the AU 
effort. Six years later, those conditions have 
not yet eventuated and the Security Coun-
cil has continued to rely upon AU AMISOM 
as the lead international peace operation 
for Somalia, even as the UN presence in the 
country has grown, especially in the last year 
or so.
For Mali, Security Council Resolution 2100 
mandated a new UN integrated stabilization 
mission – MINUSMA – to begin on 1 July 
2013, provided that combat peace making 
operations have ended and the capacity of 
opposition forces have been reduced in the 
areas of MINUSMA’s deployment. AFISMA’s 
current mandate runs until 20 December 
2013 unless there is a transfer of authority 
to a new UN mission on 1 July. By no later 
than 25 June, the Security Council will deter-
mine whether the security situation has been 
sufficiently stabilized for the UN mission to 
take over from AFISMA on 1 July. If not, the 
deployment timeline for the UN missions 
will be reviewed as needed. 
Both Mali and Somalia have to contend 
with capable and determined Islamist-
inspired insurgencies, that have exploited 
centre-periphery political tensions, chronic 
humanitarian crises, weak governance, inter-
nationally linked organized criminal net-
works, banditry and lawlessness. In both Mali 
and Somalia, African Union-led peace sup-
port operations have been a central pillar in 
the political and security stabilization efforts.
The new prominence of the African Union 
as a peace and security actor, together with 
regional bodies such as the Intergovern-
mental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
in the Somalia context, the Economic Com-
munity for West African States (ECOWAS) in 
Mali, and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) in the context of the 
UN intervention brigade in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, is indicative of the 
emergence of stronger peace and security 
capacities in Africa over the last decade as a 
result of, amongst others, international sup-
port for African initiatives such as the African 
Standby Force.
AMISOM and AFISMA both reflect a new 
networked pattern in the international secu-
rity architecture where international and 
regional organisations are increasingly work-
ing in close partnership (although not always 
easily) to further regional and international 
political and security interests (Boutellis and 
Williams 2013a). For instance, in Somalia, in 
addition to AMISOM that is backstopped by a 
UN support mission (UNSOA), there are IGAD 
and UN political missions, and a UN Country 
Team that coordinates the UN humanitarian 
and development agencies. The EU supports 
AMISOM, and also runs a security sector sup-
port mission that trains Somali government 
forces, as well as supporting humanitarian, 
development and peace-building initiatives. 
The EU has deployed a similar training mis-
sion to Mali. There are also a large number 
of bilateral donors and actors in Somalia, of 
which Ethiopia, Turkey the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Japan and Italy are prob-
ably the most prominent. Ethiopia and the 
United States are also involved militarily. 
There is a large anti-piracy mission off the 
coast of Somalia with three separate (EU, 
NATO and an UN-coordinated) international 
naval operations. The number of actors and 
the variety of different development, diplo-
matic and security interventions thus make 
for a complex and often unwieldy network 
of international peace and security actors. 
However, in both Mali and Somalia, this com-
plex network of international and regional 
actors, and the total cumulative effect their 
combined efforts are able to generate, are 
indicative of the shape future international 
interventions are likely to take, namely a net-
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worked-pattern of multi-stakeholder coop-
eration and partnerships.
With the mission in Mali only recently 
operational, there is a real opportunity for 
AFISMA to draw on the six years of lessons 
learned from AMISOM in Somalia. At the 
same time heed must be paid to the two 
unique recent histories of Somalia and Mali, 
in terms of the origins of conflict, the fragil-
ity of state and security institutions and the 
involvement of troops and partners from 
outside Africa. Notwithstanding inherent 
difficulties in transferring lessons between 
unique situations, we argue that the AMI-
SOM experience can offer some useful les-
sons for those that are likely to be engaged 
in similar missions in Mali.
Much has been written on the deficiencies 
and challenges that characterised AMISOM’s 
early struggle to secure Mogadishu. This 
paper focuses on both positive and negative 
lessons emerging from the AMISOM experi-
ence for AFISMA planners and their partners. 
Irrespective of when and how the AFISMA 
mission is absorbed into the planned UN 
peacekeeping mission, important lessons 
can be shared between these two unique 
African peace operations. 
Interpreting the Mandate 
When the UN Security Council adopted Reso-
lution 1772 in 2007 it authorized AMISOM 
to take “all necessary measures” to inter alia 
protect the institutions of the Transitional 
Institutions of the Somali government and 
“support dialogue and reconciliation” by pro-
viding protection and safe passage to person-
nel involved. In Resolution 2036 of 2012 the 
Security Council was more specific in author-
ising AMISOM “to reduce the threat posed 
by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition 
groups in order to establish conditions for 
effective and legitimate governance across 
Somalia.” Despite the political objectives, 
AMISOM’s role, circumscribed by the overall 
scope and direction of the Security Council, 
was originally primarily seen as a military 
contribution, aimed at creating an enabling 
security environment, and part of a wider 
political strategy that is still taking shape.
Since 2007 the Ugandan-led AMISOM 
force has gradually implemented its man-
date with a sense of growing confidence and 
robustness. Backed-up by political commit-
ment and support, AMISOM was from 2011 
able to exploit the weakening support for 
Al Shabaab in the context of the devastating 
drought that affected Somalia at the time, 
to recover the main urban centres and sur-
rounding areas from Al Shabaab. 
AMISOM was initially constrained to 
defending itself, the transitional govern-
ment, and the air and seaports in Mogadishu 
with barely more than a couple of thousand 
troops. The mission gradually grew in size, 
with several incremental expansions of a few 
thousand soldiers at a time, until an increase 
of almost 6,000 in the troop ceiling occurred 
in early 20123. Uganda, and more recently 
Kenya’s, political resolve and national com-
mitment to robustly interpret and imple-
ment the mandate has helped to overcome 
the political and bureaucratic inertia that 
can often characterise such multilateral mis-
sions. A similar commitment from the lead-
ing troop contributors will be critical to the 
success of AFISMA, and then MINUSMA, 
both in Mali and in the corridors of power in 
Abuja and Addis Ababa.
Similarly, the sustained attention, politi-
cal support and commitment of the AU 
and IGAD remains critical to the success of 
AMISOM, and similar political commitment 
from regional powers and neighbours will 
be equally important in the Mali context. 
Transferring AFISMA to a UN peacekeeping 
mission may ease transaction costs when 
it comes to the support of the mission, but 
moving the reporting lines to New York may 
result in diminished focus on the mission in 
Addis Ababa and regional capitals. In New 
York, Mali would just be one of many mis-
sions that the Security Council and the UN 
Secretariat are responsible for, but in Addis 
Ababa and Abuja, it would represent a major 
commitment and attract considerable focus 
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and attention. As UN and other lessons 
learned studies have pointed out in the past, 
and as reflected in the AMISOM experience, 
political focus and commitment is one of the 
critical ingredients for mission success. 
Autonomy in the Field 
AMISOM operations on the ground have been 
successful, in part, because they have had 
minimal micro-management from African 
Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa. While 
being kept briefed on forthcoming opera-
tions, the political head of AMISOM, the Spe-
cial Representative of the Chairperson of the 
AU Commission (SRCC), provided political 
cover to Addis Ababa, but was not involved 
in directing day-to-day operations. Within 
the operational direction of the Force Com-
mander, contingent and battalion command-
ers have had a high degree of autonomy4 to 
pursue tactical objectives in their respective 
areas of operations. If AFISMA is called upon 
to undertake similar offensive operations, 
it will do well to give its field commanders 
the same degree of tactical autonomy, within 
a framework that provides clear strategic, 
political and operational direction. 
Coordination in a Growing Force
For the most of its existence, AMISOM has 
operated with just two troop contributing 
countries, and under the strong leadership of 
Uganda. The role Uganda played, initially as 
lead nation, and throughout as the bedrock 
of the mission, and the backing President 
Museveni of Uganda was able to mobilize 
for the mission from the AU & UN, the USA 
and the EU, resulted in the AMISOM having 
a very solid political and military anchor. In 
contrast, there is no one country in West 
Africa that has stepped up to play such a 
strong leadership role. Historically Nigeria 
played this role, but it is currently consumed 
by its own internal Boko Haram insurrection, 
and it is thus not able to play a similar lead-
ing role in AFISMA. After Kenya crossed the 
Somali border on 16 October 2011, and mus-
tered diplomatic support to join AMISOM 
in the subsequent months, some feared a 
fragmentation of the Mission. However, the 
AU and AMISOM seem to have successfully 
adapted their command and control arrange-
ments. Amongst others, it created a Military 
Operations Coordinating Committee (MOCC) 
to ensure force cohesion. The Government of 
Somalia and international partners, in partic-
ular the UN and EU, also adapted their sup-
port arrangements to absorb the new mission 
configuration. This flexibility enabled the 
AU, AMISOM and its partners to develop the 
mechanisms and relationships they needed 
to mitigate the risk of fragmentation and to 
develop the coordination mechanisms neces-
sary to manage the influx of new troop and 
police contributors, and allowed for overall 
mission coherence while operational and 
tactical objectives were pursued in the sec-
tors by different contingents.
AFISMA and its partners will need to be 
mindful to retain the same resilience and 
ability to adapt, so that they can respond to 
dynamic developments on the ground and in 
the corridors of power. In part, this requires 
that partners should not rely on overly for-
mal and bureaucratic coordination and sup-
port mechanisms. They should be mindful 
that the one thing they can be certain of is a 
highly dynamic context that will result in the 
needs of the mission evolving continuously. 
The way to cope with this complexity is to 
adapt to it regularly. Trying to impose arti-
ficial certainty through bureaucratic means 
will further constrain, not facilitate, mission 
management and support.
The AMISOM experience has demonstrated 
the importance of strong political support 
from the countries contributing troops, and 
formed police units, and the usefulness of 
involving them in the strategic direction of 
the mission. The Military Operations Coordi-
nation Committee (MOCC) mechanism has 
engaged the Chiefs of Defence Forces and 
other senior diplomatic and military officials, 
and this has greatly eased national-level own-
ership and decision-making in support of 
mission requests. Few other multinational 
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organisations involve their Troop and Police 
contributing countries in a similar manner, 
but the degree to which this resulted in 
political commitment and the provision of 
technical support for the mission shows that 
it has been very effective in the case of AMI-
SOM. The AU and ECOWAS should consider 
how to similarly engage the Troop and Police 
contributing countries in the strategic direc-
tion and support of AFISMA. 
On the battlefield, interoperability of 
equipment and doctrine, and communication 
between the two longest-serving AMISOM 
contingents, English-speaking Ugandans and 
French-speaking Burundis, took time to work 
efficiently.5 AFISMA will face similar lan-
guage, and other interoperability challenges, 
and it will do well to dedicate some of it mis-
sion and sector HQ assets to regularly review 
and adjust its operating procedures to create 
mission and context specific solutions as the 
force composition develops.
Multi-national Resolve and Taking 
the Operational Initiative 
A prominent feature of AMISOM’s opera-
tions in Somalia has been the patient resolve 
of its contributors: the unwavering political 
support of the AU despite several years of 
slow-paced urban combat; the resilience of 
the TCCs in the face of high casualty num-
bers; and the commitment of the interna-
tional and regional partners notwithstand-
ing widespread skepticism and initial slow 
progress. Even serious incidents like Al 
Shabaab’s attack on the Force Headquarters 
in September 2009, which killed the Deputy 
Force Commander and other key staff, did 
not ultimately reduce the tempo of opera-
tions or shake the resolve of the mission’s 
principal financiers and political proponents 
in the international community.
From the early days of fighting from Moga-
dishu airport, to the expansive offensive oper-
ations of the past eighteen months, AMISOM 
has developed urban tactical approaches 
that have successfully defeated Al Shabaab 
by concentrating force in key locations, and 
by determinedly ‘cutting’ territory from Al 
Shabaab and ‘pasting’ it to the areas con-
trolled by the government. AMISOM has also 
benefited from a broader military, intelli-
gence and diplomatic effort involving inter-
national partners that has sought to disrupt 
Al Shabaab’s funding, leadership and recruit-
ment; including sanctions on Eritrea, disrup-
tion of the hawala money transfer system 
and other revenue streams, counter-piracy 
measures, strikes by UAVs by bilateral part-
ners, and court proceedings against Somalis 
around the world. AMISOM has also ben-
efited from an UN-supported information 
campaign that has contributed to reversing 
a defeatist international and regional media 
narrative about Somalia. 
AFISMA can shorten its own learning curve 
by adopting some of these lessons. The mis-
sion leadership, ECOWAS, AU and TCC capi-
tals should work with international partners 
in a larger international diplomatic effort, 
and the mission should invest in a robust 
information campaign. All those involved 
need to prepare themselves for setbacks and, 
at times, incremental progress, and ensure 
there is the necessary political resolve on the 
“home front” in Troop and Police contribut-
ing countries to sustain the mission through 
hard times.
Enabling Capabilities
AMISOM has evolved from fighting in the 
urban environment of Mogadishu to dispers-
ing its force over a much wider area, and the 
need for force enablers and multipliers has 
similarly changed.6 AMISOM has struggled 
with insufficient specialist equipment but 
over time and through a variety of mecha-
nisms the UN and international partners 
have stepped in to identify and supply some 
specific military capabilities. 
It took many years to build some basic mil-
itary facilities to a satisfactory level, particu-
larly in terms of medical support. Through 
UN support, AMISOM has acquired access 
to a small yet still insufficient number of 
outsourced helicopters for medical evacu-
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ation and transport functions, an increas-
ingly important feature as troops are now 
dispersed over a wide area. Although iden-
tified as a part of the most recent AMISOM 
strategic concept, the maritime component 
remains unfunded and woefully inadequate. 
It is also still controversial, with both the 
Government of Somalia and key partners 
reluctant to embrace the idea that a mari-
time component is necessary.
With bilateral support, AMISOM has 
acquired some equipment that, together 
with specific tactics, have been deployed on 
the battlefield to great effect. For example, 
during intense periods of urban fighting, 
armoured bulldozers proved vital to the 
steady advance of the frontline and breach-
ing Al-Shabaab trench systems in Moga-
dishu. A secure tactical radio network, sig-
nal intelligence and reconnaissance UAVs 
have been key force assets that have allowed 
a relatively lightly armed infantry force to 
gain the upper hand over Al-Shabaab. In 
many cases, bilateral partners have pro-
vided such capabilities, together with the 
necessary training. 
The operational requirements of AFISMA 
and MINUSMA will be very different but 
identification of enablers must be an early 
focus in planning and revisited as the mission 
progresses. Early on, planners should iden-
tify the key enablers to support its expan-
sion in the remote north, and the mission’s 
leadership should prioritise acquiring those 
assets in the early stages of the campaign. In 
subsequent phases, this requirement for ena-
blers may well change significantly. Working 
with partners, AFISMA should be sensitive 
to emerging requirements on the battlefield 
and provide planning capacity so that it can 
effectively anticipate, prioritise and meet the 
needs of battlefield commanders. MINUSMA, 
with its different role, will also need to 
review the needs of its mission. Both must 
make an effort to obtain the necessary equip-
ment, personnel and resources before their 
absence critically constrains mission success.
Funding and Adequately Resourcing 
the Mission
The funding structure for AMISOM has prag-
matically evolved over the years, in response 
to changing needs and a growing force size, 
albeit with time lapses. Despite the consid-
erable speed and scope of this evolution, a 
characteristic of regional operations sup-
ported by the UN and other partners is that 
‘non-organic’ support provided by third par-
ties often falls short of operational require-
ments on the ground. Resource constraints, 
the absence of key enablers and force mul-
tipliers like air assets, and high transaction 
costs between bureaucracies will limit what 
such missions can achieve. AFISMA’s plan-
ners should be conservative in the scale of 
the support they can expect to receive in the 
short term. This may be further prejudiced 
with the impending deployment of a UN 
mission which may cause contributors to not 
finance AFISMA as well. 
During the first two years of its deploy-
ment the force depended almost entirely 
on bilateral support from the United 
States7, the European Union’s African Peace 
Facility8 and the United Kingdom, to sup-
plement the support provided by the TCCs. 
In 2009 the United Nations stepped in with 
an unprecedented solution to reinforce the 
existing revenue streams. Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1872 created a combined 
structure of UN assessed contributions and 
voluntary funding for the Mission, with a 
logistical support mission in the form of 
the United Nations Support Office to AMI-
SOM (UNSOA).
A voluntary UN-administered Trust Fund 
was established as well, and it was initially 
designed to reimburse contingents for equip-
ment used on operations and to match allow-
ances for troops to levels equivalent to UN 
peacekeepers. However, donations were irreg-
ular and generally inadequate to cover contin-
gent owned equipment, often leaving reim-
bursements in arrears.9 For operations on the 
ground this reportedly disrupted the supply 
and maintenance of vital military equipment.
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In February 2012, the funding structure 
adapted again to enable a growing AMISOM 
to exploit an Al-Shabaab in retreat, with 
costs of contingent equipment being shifted 
to the UN’s assessed contributions budget. 
This provided more regular funding to the 
expanded Force size of 17,731 and supported 
a limited number of logistical requirements 
for a more dispersed Force. It was, to a large 
degree, an acknowledgement that more ade-
quate and predictable funding was needed if 
AMISOM was to sustain and expand its suc-
cessful campaign against Al-Shabaab (Gelot, 
Gelot & de Coning 2012).
The Trust Fund (Table 1), which has 
received $77m since 2009, has been attrac-
tive for donors and the UN alike as finances 
can be ear-marked for specific capabilities 
and donors are satisfied that money will be 
properly accounted for. However, from the 
point of view of battlefield commanders, 
there can be significant delays caused by 
unwieldy tendering processes.
The support from the UN, EU and major 
bilateral donors remain vital to cover the core 
needs of the Mission and its contributors. At 
times, there have been delays in important 
bilateral funding, including for allowances 
for troops and salaries for Somali secu-
rity forces (Williams and Schulman 2012). 
Ensuring timely procurement of appropri-
ate equipment to match developments on 
the battlefield has been a problem for some 
bilateral partners that have provided equip-
ment in-kind. These are all important les-
sons that AFISMA and MINUSMA, and their 
international partners, will need to play close 
attention too. 
Building Alliances
Since deployment, AMISOM operations have 
been constrained by resources, particularly 
force size, despite repeated requests for 
increases in force strength from the African 
Union. When the first 1,650 Ugandan AMI-
SOM troops arrived in March 2007 they were 
intended to replace an estimated 10,000 
Ethiopian troops deployed in Mogadishu 
and Baidoa. Nonetheless, by 2013, AMISOM 
has emerged to become the central pillar of 
stability in Somalia. It did not do this alone 
but relied on a series of partnerships and 
alliances with the Somali government forces 
and other armed groups in the country. It 
is not clear that such alliances and partner-
ships have emerged yet in Mali. Compared 
to AMISOM, the much smaller AFISMA force 
will be further challenged by its role in rein-
forcing the Malian Army.
AMISOM has grown its force size by dem-
onstrating success, but at the same time it 
has relied on a range of armed groups and 
forces across Somalia, to different degrees at 
different times. Somali government forces 
have mostly complemented AMISOM on 
operations, providing vital human intelli-
Year Trust Fund 
income*
Trust Fund 
expenditure
Assessed fund-
ing expenditure
Total annual 
expenditure
2009 28.7 5.5 71.9 77.4
2010 4 8.1 160.2 168.3
2011 13.2 20.8 210 230.8
2012 30.3 22.8 287.5 310.3
Total 76.2 57.2 729.6 786.8
Table 1: Trust Fund and UN Assessed Contributions to AMISOM ($ million). Source: United 
Nations Support Office to AMISOM (UNSOA).
*Contributors to the Trust Fund have been Australia, Canada, Czech rep, Denmark, Germany, 
India, Japan, Korea, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Turkey, UK.
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gence and population engagement, although 
their independence, reliability and quality 
remains low. Militia forces, including Ahlu 
Sunna Wal Jama’a and Ras Kamboni, have 
been vital allied components for operations 
outside Mogadishu, particularly the latter in 
the operation to take and hold Kismayo. Sim-
ilarly, two armed, mobile AMISOM Formed 
Police Units numbering 280 police, now 
backfill and supplement security in areas of 
Mogadishu vacated by AMISOM’s regular sol-
diers. Somali police are being trained to per-
manently take over this function. 
Training and improving the Somali secu-
rity forces is increasingly becoming a prior-
ity for AMISOM10, as is the work of the civil-
ian component in supporting the provision 
of effective governance by the Government 
of Somalia in those areas recovered from Al-
Shabaab.11 As the mission increasingly takes 
on the function of keeping the peace, the 
international military, political and humani-
tarian machinery will need to become bet-
ter harmonised. 
The AFISMA-Malian joint concept of opera-
tions similarly identified training and equip-
ping the Malian security forces as a central 
element in its mission. French commanders 
and others have been confronted by how 
badly demoralised, inadequately trained, 
supplied, paid and equipped the Malian 
forces have proved to be. It envisaged sup-
porting over ten thousand Malian security 
personnel, which will include basic and spe-
cialist training, and equipping many of them. 
The EU has deployed a fifteen-month mission 
of some two hundred trainers to work with 
the Malian army, although some are already 
predicting it may take longer (Croft 2013). 
In Somalia, the EU mission for training 
national forces has been operational since 
the beginning of 2010 and still has a lot 
more to do. Some AMISOM battalions have 
also received training by US forces in Uganda 
prior to deployment. This commitment to 
training both the African-led force and the 
Somali forces has started to pay some divi-
dends but it has taken time to develop and 
evolve. The scope and pace of the training of 
the Somali national forces are now expected 
to increase substantially in the wake of inter-
national commitments made at the 2013 
Somalia Conference in London.
By paying attention to lessons learned 
from the Somali experience, AFISMA and 
international partners may be able to win 
some time in Mali, but the Somalia experi-
ence also serves as a warning to those that 
may have unrealistic expectations regarding 
the time-frame within which such training 
and support can start to show dividends. 
Gaining and Maintaining Popular 
Support
Recognising the risks of fighting among 
an urban population, the African force pri-
oritised activities and used cultural ties to 
attract the support of the Somali population. 
Regular meetings with community leaders, 
out-patient clinics for treating Somali civil-
ians, and donations of clean drinking water 
have been purposefully used by AMISOM to 
build and maintain the support of the popu-
lation and political leaders during the most 
intensive period of the military campaign.
However, difficult lessons have also 
been learned. It took time for AMISOM to 
acknowledge that its use of mortar, artillery 
and rocket fire resulted in civilian deaths 
(Human Rights Watch 2010), and to adjust 
its Rules of Engagement accordingly. As the 
battleground has changed from the towns 
and open ground of conventional urban 
and maneuverist warfare to asymmetric 
warfare, the support of the civilian popula-
tion is increasingly seen as the central prize 
by both sides (Beadle 2012). Most recently, 
recommendations for incorporating civilian 
protection into AMISOM’s work have been 
drawn-up based on two pillars which look at 
protecting civilians from harm during AMI-
SOM operations and strengthen processes for 
civilian protection in AMISOM’s area of oper-
ations, and at the time of writing an AMISOM 
PoC strategy was pending approval.12 
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Despite its sophisticated propaganda 
capacity and sustained efforts to discredit 
the international force and its motives, Al-
Shabaab failed to create substantial Somali 
opposition to AMISOM. On the other hand, 
AMISOM was able to exploit Al-Shabaab’s 
withdrawal from Mogadishu and waning 
support for the militants following their 
unpopular response to the famine and aid 
effort in 2010–11. Looking forward, AMISOM 
will need to develop a very different skill-
set to maintain consent for their presence 
as Somali leaders and the population grow 
increasingly independent.
For AFISMA, it will be similarly important 
to minimize civilian casualties and to adopt 
a protection of civilians posture. This will 
require a genuine people-centered approach 
that puts the actual needs of the population 
first. It will also require an embedded capac-
ity to undertake serious information opera-
tions, to counter propaganda and to ensure 
that force actions and information opera-
tions are better synchronised and support 
the overall mission objectives. As AFISMA is 
the first AU mission to have an approved Pro-
tection of Civilians policy it is off to a good 
start, but the policy would need political will 
and aligned resources to have an impact.13
Conclusion
African military operations in Mali and 
Somalia are at very different stages of matu-
rity. The force, and its supporting partners, 
in Somalia have accumulated a wealth of 
context specific knowledge and expertise 
over six years of operations and under its 
own command. In Mali, AFISMA has only 
recently been thrust into operations around 
different areas in the north, with consider-
able support from the French. The situa-
tion in Mali is developing rapidly and it is 
unclear exactly what is in store for AFISMA. 
Most immediately, as AFISMA may transi-
tion into a UN peacekeeping mission with 
less reliance on a sizeable French combat 
contingent, we argue that important les-
sons for the African force in Mali can be 
gleaned from the hard-won experiences of 
AMISOM in Somalia.
We have identified several major themes 
that helped to drive success for the AMI-
SOM mission despite serious deficiencies in 
its early years – the determination of troop 
contributors and their funding partners; 
effective mechanisms to fully engage troop 
and police contributors in planning and deci-
sion-making; blending bilateral support with 
a long term and predictable funding stream; 
the gradual escalation of force; providing key 
specialised equipment and enablers; actively 
pursuing the support of the host population, 
and being mindful of the unfolding political 
process. In addition, the African character of 
the force has been a visible hallmark of the 
AU intervention in Somalia, with the leader-
ship and initial bulk of the fighting forces 
deployed by a lead-nation, Uganda. And it 
was important that the lead-nation was gen-
erally perceived by the population as a rela-
tively benign actor in Somalia.
At the operational and tactical levels, we 
have highlighted a number of features that 
AMISOM has adopted - context-specific train-
ing, autonomy in commanding operations, 
a high degree of adaptability, working with 
allied armed groups in Somalia and a dogged 
determination to see the fight through by 
the troop contributing nations. 
In the African Union and United Nations, 
a repository of knowledge now exists about 
how to assemble a financial and logistical 
support package under difficult conditions 
for a non-UN operation implementing one of 
the most challenging stabilisation operations 
in its history. It has been a story with both 
positive developments and setbacks, fraught 
at times with organisational inefficiency and 
delays, but ultimately it is a story of organic 
adaptation and pragmatic compromises. 
Partners and donors, troop and police con-
tributing countries and AMISOM showed 
enduring resilience in conducting operations 
against a tenacious enemy in a difficult envi-
ronment. That patience paid dividends when 
Al-Shabaab weakened in the middle of 2011 
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and opened the opportunity for AMISOM to 
prosecute the strategic objective: building 
sufficient secure space for a political peace 
process. Nevertheless, the next stage for both 
operations may be the most challenging yet 
as African Union troops are called to keep a 
complex and fragile peace in Mali and Soma-
lia. Of additional interest will be the evolving 
relationships of the AU operations with the 
UN peace missions in each country. In Soma-
lia, despite the conditions not being right 
for a UN peacekeeping mission, a larger UN 
political office is set to engage closely with 
AMISOM, while in Mali there are real pros-
pects that a UN peacekeeping mission will 
soon absorb the mission. 
Notes
 1 The authors wish to acknowledge the in-
puts many AU and UN officers, and other 
key stakeholders made during interviews 
or by commenting on drafts, and in this 
regard we wish to single out Paul Keating, 
who assisted with research for this article 
in Uganda, and to whom we are indebted 
for very comprehensive and useful inputs 
and comments. We also wish to express 
appreciation for the research support 
provided by Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik 
and Paul Troost, both Junior Research 
Fellows at the Norwegian Institute of In-
ternational Affairs (NUPI). This research 
was commissioned by the NUPI and sup-
ported by the Norwegian funded Train-
ing for Peace Programme in Africa (www.
trainingforpeace.org).
 2 Since its inception, AMISOM was expect-
ed to transition in due course into a UN 
peacekeeping operation, however, six 
years later the conditions for this transi-
tion have not yet materialised.
 3 At the end of 2010 the Force size grew from 
approximately 8,000 to 12,000 troops.
 4 During the early stages of the Kenyan de-
ployment, in support of the larger AMI-
SOM mandate, including the operation 
to take Kismayo, the absence of secure 
radio communication with the AMISOM 
Force Headquarters meant the Kenyan 
Commander had freedom to design and 
implement their operation.
 5 An advance contingent of Burundi sol-
diers was deployed to Mogadishu in 
December 2007. The main Burundi con-
tingent did not completely deploy until 
October 2008. In 2012 troops from Dji-
bouti and Sierra Leone began deploying. 
 6 Enablers, including maritime compo-
nent, air assets (transport, attack, mede-
vac), engineering, and counter-IED have 
been requested.
 7 Since its initial deployment in 2007, the 
United States has contributed over 429 
million US dollars to support AMISOM. 
The United States has provided this sup-
port on a voluntary basis, and this amount 
does not include assessed contributions 
for the UN logistics support package ad-
ministered by the UN Support Office for 
AMISOM (UNSOA). The United States pro-
vides all of its support for AMISOM in kind, 
including equipment, logistics support, 
advice, and training for AMISOM Troop 
Contributing Countries (TCCs).
 8 The EU, through the African Peace Facil-
ity, has supported the AMISOM mission 
with 444 million Euros since 2007, pri-
marily supporting operational costs, in-
cluding eventually supplementing allow-
ances up to the level of UN peacekeepers.
 9 The Peace and Security Council in October 
2010 noted that Troop Contributing Coun-
tries had not received reimbursement for 
contingent owned equipment since March 
that year http://www.peaceau.org/up-
loads/psc-report-on-somalia-en.pdf 
 10 Security Council Resolution 2073 (2012) 
requires AMISOM to support the imple-
mentation of the National Security and 
Stabilisation Plan, “in particular the ef-
fective re-establishment and training of 
all-inclusive SNSF”.
 11 Resolution 2073 (2012) mandated a fur-
ther 50 civilian staff for AMISOM.
 12 Based on an interview with an AU official 
on 17 May 2013. See also the ‘Report of 
the Workshop on Mainstreaming Protec-
tion of Civilians Considerations into the 
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Operations of the African Union Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM)’, 21 – 22 June 2012, 
Nairobi, Kenya, available at: http://civil-
ian.peaceau.org/index.php?option=com_
docman&task=doc_details&Itemid=61&gi
d=148&lang=en
 13 According to an AU official that was in-
terviewed on 17 May 2013, a Protection 
of Civilians (PoC) strategy for AFISMA 
was approved in May 2013. The official 
also pointed out that PoC was part of the 
AFISMA mandate as per UNSC Resolu-
tion 2085, and it was thus also strongly 
embedded in the CONOPS endorsed by 
ECOWAS and the AU. 
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